You PGP key actually contains more than just the master key (used to sign other keys and your own subkeys, and what actually is signed by other users): one subkey for signing messages (optional, usually is the master key itself, but not necessarily) and one for encrypting content. More info on the Debian Wiki and on the GNU Privacy Handbook.
So... You could keep your master key only on a secure device, allowing you to exchange your signing and encryption keys without your peers having to verify and sign new keys. By keeping your master key safely stored, you could have a more vigorous key rotation policy without creating too much work for others. Also, in the even of a suspected or confirmed leek of subkey secret material, you could revoke them without much hassle.
I personally use a two subkey setup (also check this question), not only to keep the master key reasonably secure, but also because I use different key sizes: the master key has 4096 bits, the signing and encryption subkeys have only 3072 bits.
On the other hand, if the environments don't overlap much, it would be best to use completely different PGP keys, greatly minimizing the damage from any possible vulnerability.
Additionally, you could (should) use very long random passphrases for you keys on the least secure devices.