Let's work our way backward.
I understand that the Tor exit node would not know who I am, because the request it is sending out is encrypted via HTTPS. But, the website it connects to would realize that a connection from that Tor exit node made a purchase for myself, or logged into a self-identifying account. Put short, they'd know that my identity was connecting to them via that Tor exit node.
Let's say that website lets the world know that I made a purchase from that Tor exit node. My thought is that other websites probably couldn't deduce my identity simply from an exit node IP, even if they knew I exited from that node, previously. I'm also thinking that even though the exit node is consistently getting requests from the same middle node, it wouldn't be able to identify that any of those requests are coming from my identity vs. other identities from that middle node. Leading to the only possible case of compromised identity being someone having access to all 3 Tor nodes, making it possible for them to trace connections. But, even if they had all 3 nodes, in my setup the entry node would be seeing an HTTPS-encrypted connection from a VPN.
This leads me to believe that I could safely log into all of my accounts and buy the same item with the same credit card a million times over, and the only way my identity could be compromised to sites I don't make purchases on is if my VPN had access to all three of my Tor nodes. Am I wrong, or am I wrong?
END GOAL: I would like to be able to buy something on Amazon and login to Facebook, then go read some random journal, all through the same browser connection, and that journal would have no idea who I am, even if Amazon and Facebook told them that I'd made purchases or logged in from that specific Tor exit node.