What happens with my encrypted files on Synology when it is stolen?
The lack of full drive encryption makes Synology solution unsafe (and slow as ecryptfs benchmarks prove). The attacker will simply collect the harddrive and harvest tons of unencrypted data: configuration, metadata, all emails (MailPlus share can NOT be encrypted), and the copies of your documents from the Synology Drive folder. Furthermore, passwords are often stored in plaintext (e.g. MailPlus/@local/GUID/GUID/.SYNOMC/fetch files), which could lead to additional access to online email/groupware resources, potentional identity theft, stalking, credit card fraud etc.
What happens with my encrypted files on Synology when it is stolen and booted again?
There's no reason for an adversary to boot if device is aquired physically, to fight the ownership and permissions of the live filesystem and authentification of the operating system. But still, as system loads and starts sharing services, it could leak data to a new network. To postpone mounting of encrypted folders, you keep keys separately from the system:
1) keep keyphrase in brain and avoid key manager
2) use key manager but rellocate keyfiles to the USB flashdrive, which can be plugged in all of the time, as Synology will eject it automatically using '[x] Eject device after boot' checkbox. Furthermore, a special USB flashdrive could be encrypted by a fingerprint (normally i'd add one more layer, and double encrypt but this is possible on workstations with TPM and automatic unlock, not on Synology)
/etc/fstab
file, find the entry for the relevant drive and remove theauto
option if present. It might be a good idea to post thefstab
here so we can have a look.